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Abstract. Data describing historical economic growth are analysed. They demonstrate 
convincingly that the takeoffs from stagnation to growth, claimed in the Unified Growth 
Theory, never happened. This theory is again contradicted by the same data which were 
used, but never properly analysed, during its formulation. The absence of the claimed 
takeoffs demonstrates that the postulate of the differential takeoffs is also contradicted by 
data. Furthermore, this analysis demonstrates that the mathematically-analysable data 
contradict the concept of the prolonged Malthusian stagnation, its effects on the economic 
growth as well as the concept of a dramatic escape from the Malthusian trap. 
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1. Introduction 
ne of the fundamental postulates of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 
2005a, 2011) is the postulate of takeoffs from stagnation to growth. This 
feature is supposed to mark a boundary between the ages-long epoch of 
Malthusian stagnation and a new epoch of a rapid economic growth. An easy way 
to test the Unified Growth Theory is to look for such postulated takeoffs because 
they should be easily identifiable. The added advantage of using this test is that it 
also checks the validity of yet another postulate of this theory, the postulate of the 
differential takeoffs.  
In our analysis we shall use the excellent data published by the world-renown 
economist (Maddison, 2010). The data presented in this compilation are virtually 
the same as in his earlier compilation (Maddison, 2001), which Galor was using 
during the formulation of his Unified Growth Theory. The difference between the 
two compilations is that the new set of data was extended to the 21st century. 
These extended data are not essential for testing the Unified Growth Theory but 
they help in demonstrating the latest transitions from the historical hyperbolic 
growth to slower trajectories. Unfortunately, Galor did not analyse Maddison’s 
data. His interpretations of the mechanism of economic growth are based on 
strongly questionable quotations of isolated numbers, on the unfortunate simplistic 
and self-misleading examination of data and on the habitual use of grossly distorted 
diagrams (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 
2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). 
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Historical economic growth and the growth of human population can be 
described using hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 
2015d, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960) Unlike 
the better-known exponential growth, which is easier to understand, hyperbolic 
distributions are strongly deceptive because they appear to be made of two 
distinctly different components, slow and fast, joined perhaps by a certain 
transition component. This illusion is so strong that even the most experienced 
researchers can be easily deceived particularly if their research is based on a 
limited body of data, as it was in the past. Fortunately, Maddison’s data solve this 
problem, and fortunately also their analysis is trivially simple because, as pointed 
out earlier (Nielsen, 2014), hyperbolic distributions can be easily identified and 
analysed using the reciprocal values of data. Consequently, if in the past, 
researchers were basing their conclusions on the strongly-limited sets of data and 
imagined that there was a prolonged epoch of stagnation followed by sudden 
takeoffs in various geographical regions, now there is no excuse to continue with 
such interpretations because we have excellent sets of data, which lead to the 
entirely different conclusions. It is, therefore surprising, if not disappointing, that 
Galor, who had access to these excellent data and even used them during the 
formulation of his theory, did not analyse them properly but followed the 
traditional and incorrect interpretations of the historical economic growth. 
Theories play an important role in scientific research because they crystallise 
interpretations of studied phenomena. However, theories have to be always tested 
by data. In science it is important to look for data confirming theoretical 
explanations but it is even more important to discover contradicting evidence, 
because data confirming a theory confirm only what we already know but 
contradicting evidence may lead to new discoveries. 
According to Galor, historical economic growth can be divided into three 
distinctly-different stages governed by three distinctly different mechanisms: (1) 
the Malthusian regime of stagnation, (2) the post-Malthusian regime, and (3) the 
sustained-growth regime. We have already demonstrated that this postulate of the 
three regimes of economic growth is contradicted by the data for Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe, Asia, countries of former USSR, Africa and Latin America 
(Nielsen, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2016b), ironically by the same data which 
were used but never analysed by Galor.  
This fundamental postulate of the three regimes of growth is used repeatedly 
throughout the narrative of the Unified Growth Theory and serves as the essential 
support for the discussed interpretations and explanations. Without this corner 
stone the whole theory becomes unsupported.  
According to Galor, “The take-off of developed regions from the Malthusian 
Regime was associated with the Industrial Revolution and occurred at the 
beginning of the 19th century, whereas the take-off of less developed regions 
occurred towards the beginning of the 20th century and was delayed in some 
countries well into the 20th century” (Galor, 2005a). Even more precisely (Galor, 
2008a, 2012a), Malthusian regime of stagnation was supposed to have been 
between 100,000 BC and AD 1750 for developed regions and between 100,000 BC 
and AD 1900 for less-developed regions. The post-Malthusian regime was 
allegedly between AD 1750 and 1850 for developed regions and from 1900 for 
less-developed regions. The sustained-growth regime was supposed to have 
commenced around 1850 for developed regions. 
The claimed starting time of the Malthusian regime appears to be based entirely 
on conjecture because Maddison’s data are terminated at AD 1 and even they 
contain significant gaps below AD 1500. The claimed date of 100,000 BC is also 
hanging in the middle of nowhere because the origin of Homo sapiens is usually 
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placed around 200,000 BC. However, Weaver, Roseman & Stringer (2008) have 
pointed out that the divergence of the lineages of modern humans and Neanderthals 
might have occurred around 309,000 BC or even 433,000 BC.  
We have no mathematically analysable data over such a long time so any claim 
of the existence of Malthusian stagnation in the economic growth in the distant past 
is based on questionable conjectures. However, we have mathematically-analysable 
data describing the growth of the population from 10,000 BC and they show that 
the growth of the population was not stagnant but hyperbolic not only during the 
AD era, as pointed out over 50 years ago by von Foerster, Mora and Amiot (1960) 
but also during the BC era (Nielsen, 2016c).  
Hyperbolic growth was slow in the past but it was not stagnant. Slow 
hyperbolic growth should never be interpreted as stagnant because if we want to 
interpret the slow hyperbolic growth as stagnant, and governed by the usually 
assumed multitude of random forces, we should use precisely the same mechanism 
to explain the fast hyperbolic growth. It is impossible to divide the monotonically-
increasing hyperbolic distributions into slow and fast components (Nielsen, 2014). 
Hyperbolic distributions have to be interpreted as a whole and the same mechanism 
has to be applied to the apparent slow growth and to the apparent fast growth. 
There is no clearly defined transition between the apparent slow and the apparent 
fast growth.  
The alleged transition at the end of the postulated regime of Malthusian 
stagnation for various regions and countries is described by Galor as “the sudden 
take-off from stagnation to growth” (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220, 277), as a “sudden 
spurt” (Galor, 2005a, 177, 220) or as “remarkable” or “stunning” escape from the 
Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220). It is a signature, which cannot be 
missed. 
For developed regions, this signature is supposed to have coincided with the 
onset of the Industrial Revolution, 1760-1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 1994). Indeed, 
Industrial Revolution is considered to have been “the prime engine of economic 
growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212). 
The signature of the takeoffs is characterised by three features: (1) it should be a 
prominent change in the pattern of growth, (2) it should be a transition from 
stagnation to growth and (3) it should occur at the time claimed by the theory. For 
developed regions, the postulated takeoffs should occur around AD 1750. For less-
developed regions, they should occur around 1900.  
A transition from growth to growth is not a signature of the postulated takeoff 
from stagnation to growth. Thus, for instance, a transition from hyperbolic growth 
to another hyperbolic growth is not a signature of the sudden takeoff from 
stagnation to growth. Likewise, a transition at a distinctly different time is not a 
confirmation of the theoretical expectations. 
We shall now demonstrate that the postulated takeoffs never happened and 
consequently that the concept of the differential takeoffs is contradicted by data, 
because in the absence of takeoffs it makes no sense to claim that they occurred at 
different times for different regions. In the future we shall also demonstrate that 
“The mind-boggling phenomenon of the Great Divergence” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) 
is mind-boggling only because it is hard to understand how anyone familiar with 
mathematics could be puzzled by such an artificially-created structure. If 
hyperbolic distributions are not properly analysed they can be used to generate 
such phantom and totally meaningless features. Scientific analysis of Maddison’s 
data opens a new outlook on the interpretation of the historical economic growth. 
Throughout the analysis presented here, the values of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) will be expressed in billions of the 1990 International Geary-
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Khamis dollars. Parameters describing the fitted distributions were determined by 
the mathematical analysis (Nielsen, 2016b) of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010). 
 
2. World economic growth 
Results of mathematical analysis of the world economic growth are presented in 
Figure 1. If the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) is 
correct, we should see clear signs of two takeoffs: around 1750 for developed 
regions and around 1900 for less-developed regions. We see none of them. 
The data and their analysis are in the direct contradiction of this theory. They 
show that the economic growth was remarkably stable and that the claimed or 
wished-for takeoffs never happened. The absence of the two claimed takeoffs is 
strikingly conspicuous. Galor’s claim of the “spectacular” or “stunning” escapes 
from Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) is spectacularly and stunningly 
contradicted by the analysis of the economic-growth data, the same data, which he 
used, but never properly analysed, during the formulation of his theory. 
The absence of the takeoffs has been also demonstrated for the income per 
capita data (GDP/cap) for the world economic growth (Nielsen, 2015e). In science, 
such single demonstration would have been sufficient to show that the Unified 
Growth Theory needs to be revised to bring it in agreement with data, however, 
when closely analysed this theory is found to be repeatedly contradicted by data 
(Nielsen, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2016a, 2016b).  
Hyperbolic growth of the world economy is in harmony with the hyperbolic 
growth of the world population (Nielsen, 2016c; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 
1960). In both cases, the growth was indeed slow over a long time and fast over a 
short time. In both cases the growth creates an illusion of stagnation followed by a 
sudden takeoff. However, in both cases the growth was hyperbolic. There was no 
stagnation and no sudden takeoff. Furthermore, in both cases the growth started to 
be diverted, relatively recently, to slower trajectories. 
 
3. Western Europe 
The growth of the GDP in Western Europe is shown in Figure 2. Results of 
analysis show that there was no takeoff from stagnation to growth because (1) there 
was no stagnation and (2) because the economic growth, which is described well 
by the hyperbolic trajectory, was stable during the time of the alleged takeoff. The 
takeoff simply did not happen. 
The claim of the stunning or remarkable takeoff is contradicted by data. There 
was no takeoff of any kind, stunning or less stunning, remarkable or less 
remarkable, sudden or gradual; none at all. The Industrial Revolution, the alleged 
“prime engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212), made no impression on 
changing the economic growth trajectory in the region where this engine should 
have been working most efficiently. Industrial Revolution brought many other 
important changes but, surprisingly perhaps, did not change the economic growth 
trajectory in the countries closest to this monumental development. 
 
4. Eastern Europe 
The analysis of the historical data for Eastern Europe is summarised in Figure 3. 
There was no stagnation and no takeoff at any time. Industrial Revolution had no 
impact on changing the economic growth trajectory in the countries of Eastern 
Europe. 
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5. Former USSR 
The analysis of the data for the countries of the former USSR is presented in 
Figure 4. There was no stagnation and no takeoff at any time. Industrial Revolution 
had no impact on changing the economic growth trajectory in the countries of 
former USSR. 
 
6. Asia 
Analysis of the historical economic growth in Asia is summarised in Figure 5. 
Asia is made primarily of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) and 
consequently, according to the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 
2012a), economic growth in this region should have been stagnant until around 
1900, the year marking the alleged stunning escape from the Malthusian trap, the 
escape manifested by the postulated dramatic takeoff. 
The data and their analysis show that there was no stagnation and no claimed 
takeoff from stagnation to growth. The data reveal a steadily increasing and stable 
hyperbolic growth until around 1950. From around that year, economic growth was 
diverted to a slightly faster trajectory. This boosting occurred close to the time of 
the postulated takeoff from stagnation to growth. However, it was not a transition 
from stagnation to growth but from growth to growth. 
It should be noted that this temporary boosting is now returning to the original 
hyperbolic trajectory and is likely to move to the other side. It is already following 
a slower trajectory, because its gradient is smaller than the gradient of the historical 
trajectory. It would be interesting to explore and explain the mechanism of this 
boosting but we shall not find its explanation in the Unified Growth Theory. This 
theory does not even notice this feature. 
 
7. Africa 
Results of analysis for Africa are presented in Figure 6. Africa is also made of 
less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) so according to the Unified 
Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) it should have experienced 
stagnation in the economic growth until around 1900 followed by a clear takeoff 
from stagnation to growth around that year. These expectations are contradicted by 
the economic growth data because (1) economic growth was not stagnant but 
hyperbolic (Nielsen, 2015d, 2016b), (2) there was no takeoff from stagnation to 
growth around 1900 or around any other time and (3) shortly after the expected 
time of the takeoff, economic growth in Africa started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. 
As discusses elsewhere (Nielsen, 2015d, 2016b), there was an acceleration in 
the economic growth in Africa around 1820. However, this acceleration occurred 
significantly earlier than the expected takeoff around 1900 and it was not a 
transition from stagnation to growth but from growth to growth. Even more 
specifically, it was a transition from the hyperbolic growth to another hyperbolic 
growth. This acceleration can be explained by noticing that it appears to coincide 
with the intensified colonisation of Africa (Duignan & Gunn, 1973; McKay, Hill, 
Buckler, Ebrey, Beck, Crowston, & Wiesner-Hanks, 2012; Pakenham, 1992). The 
fast increasing GDP after 1820 was not reflecting the rapidly improving living 
conditions of African population brought about by the beneficial changes caused 
by the Industrial Revolution but the rapidly increasing wealth of new settlers and 
their countries of origin at the expense of the deploring living conditions of the 
native populations. 
The takeoff from stagnation to growth, claimed by the Unified Growth Theory 
(Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a), did not happen in the region where stagnation 
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should have been prominently present. Economic growth was always stable in 
Africa (Nielsen, 2015d, 2016b) and now it is being diverted to a slower trajectory. 
Escape from the Malthusian trap never happened because there was no trap. 
Economic growth was never stagnant in Africa but hyperbolic. 
 
8. Latin America 
Results of the analysis of the economic growth in Latin America are presented 
in Figure 7. Latin America is also made of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; 
Pereira, 2011) so again, according to the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 
2008a, 2011, 2012a), economic growth in this region should have been stagnant 
until around 1900 and fast-increasing from around that year. This pattern of growth 
is stunningly contradicted by data, the same data, which were used, but never 
properly analysed, during the formulation of this theory. At the time of the claimed 
“stunning” and “remarkable” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 
177, 220) economic growth in Latin America was already diverted to a slower 
trajectory. 
 
9. Summary and conclusions 
Results of mathematical analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) show 
convincingly that takeoffs from stagnation to growth, claimed repeatedly in the 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) never happened. The 
growth of the GDP was not stagnant but hyperbolic and, in general, remarkably 
stable. 
It is essential to understand that claims about the existence of the epoch of 
Malthusian stagnation in the economic growth or in the growth of human 
population are not supported by the scientifically-analysable data. They are based 
on conjectures and impressions and they introduce the unwelcome and undesirable 
ballast in the economic and demographic research, directing them into 
unproductive channels, which move the economic and demographic research away 
from science and develop them into a fiction, because in the absence of 
scientifically analysable data the concepts of stagnation and of the dramatic escape 
from the mythical Malthusian trap are supported by creative writing. 
A clear way of demonstrating that the doctrine of Malthusian stagnation and its 
effects on the economic growth or on the growth of human population is incorrect 
is by demonstrating the absence of the takeoffs from the alleged stagnation to 
growth. As demonstrated here, such takeoffs did not exist in the economic growth. 
They also did not exist in the growth of human population (Nielsen, 2016c, 2016d). 
Demographic Transition Theory, the only theory used by demographers to explain 
the historical growth of human population, also claims the existence of Malthusian 
stagnation followed by a dramatic takeoff from stagnation to growth but this theory 
is repeatedly contradicted by data (Nielsen, 2016e). 
Slow economic growth or the growth of human population is routinely 
interpreted as stagnation but such interpretations are incorrect because the slow 
growth is an integral part of the hyperbolic growth, which cannot be divided into 
slow and fast components (Nielsen, 2014) and which has to be interpreted as a 
whole by using the same mechanism for the whole distribution. We already know 
that the growth of human population during the AD and BC eras was not stagnant 
but hyperbolic from at least 10,000 BC (Nielsen, 2016c; von Foerster, Mora & 
Amiot, 1960). We do not have mathematically-analysable data for the economic 
growth over such a long time, but the data we have (Maddison, 2010) show 
conclusively that during the time described by these data, economic growth was 
also hyperbolic and consequently that it was not stagnant. Furthermore, we have 
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also proven that Galor’s concept of the existence of the three regimes of growth is 
contradicted by the analysis of the economic growth in Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe, Asia, countries of the former USSR, Africa and Latin America (Nielsen, 
2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2016a).  
There is no scientific support for the concept of Malthusian stagnation and for 
the dramatic escape from the Malthusian trap, which is supposed to have been 
manifested in the dramatic takeoffs. Mathematically analysable data describing 
economic growth and the growth of human population show repeatedly and 
consistently that takeoffs from stagnation to growth never happened because there 
was no stagnation. Mathematically analysable data show repeatedly and 
consistently that the economic growth and the growth of human population were 
hyperbolic. Concepts of prolonged stagnation followed by a “remarkable” or 
“stunning” escape from Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) are 
repeatedly and consistently contradicted by data. 
In science, such overwhelming evidence would have been more than sufficient 
to show that the theory is unacceptable and that it should be either thoroughly 
revised or rejected and replaced by a more suitable theory, a theory based on 
scientific analysis of data, a reliable theory, which could be used in the economic 
growth research. In its present form, Unified Growth Theory is neither reliable nor 
useful. In fact it is strongly misleading. 
Our analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) shows not only that the 
concept of Malthusian regime of stagnation followed by dramatic escapes from 
Malthusian trap is incorrect but also that the concept of the differential takeoffs is 
incorrect because we cannot have differential takeoffs without takeoffs. 
Unified Growth Theory is riddled with questionable claims and interpretations. 
In due time, we shall demonstrate that this theory is contradicted by regional 
GDP/cap data in much the same way as it is contradicted by the global data 
(Nielsen, 2015e). We shall show that this theory is contradicted by the economic 
growth in the UK, the centre of the Industrial Revolution where the Unified Growth 
Theory should have the strongest support. It can be also shown that this theory is 
contradicted by the economic growth in other individual countries. 
We shall demonstrate that the postulate of the great divergence is also based on 
the incorrect interpretation of the mathematical properties of hyperbolic 
distributions. Furthermore, we shall demonstrate that Galor’s repeated 
interpretation of growth rates of income per capita is incorrect. 
In its present form, Unified Growth Theory is unacceptable. In order to improve 
it, it would be necessary to examine it closely to determine not only how much of it 
is based on the incorrect interpretation of data but also how much is just pure 
fantasy. However, the best solution would probably be to replace it by a new 
theory. 
Close analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) opens new and fascinating 
avenues for the economic research. Rather than devoting time and financial 
resources on explaining features based on impressions and on the already 
contradicted conjectures, we can focus our attention of explaining the features 
confirmed by the scientific analysis of data. In particular, the relevant and still 
unanswered questions are why the historical economic growth was hyperbolic, 
what mechanism should we use to explain this type of growth and why, relatively 
recently, the economic growth, global and regional, has been diverted to generally 
slower trajectories. Even the temporarily slightly boosted economic growth in Asia 
appears to be also a part of the generally-observed diversions to slower trajectories.  
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World Economic Growth 
 
Figure 1. No takeoffs from stagnation to growth. Two postulated takeoffs are indicated 
(Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a): for developed regions around 1750 and for less-
developed regions around 1900. The world economic growth was not stagnant but 
hyperbolic and it was remarkably stable. Industrial Revolution, “the prime engine of 
economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212), had no impact on changing the economic growth 
trajectory. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) is contradicted by 
data. 
 
 
Western Europe 
 
Figure 2. No takeoff from stagnation to growth. Economic growth in Western Europe was 
not stagnant but hyperbolic and it was remarkably stable. Industrial Revolution, “the prime 
engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212), had no impact on changing the 
economic growth trajectory where this “engine” should have worked most efficiently. 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) is contradicted by data.  
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Eastern Europe 
 
Figure 3. No takeoff from stagnation to growth. Economic growth in Eastern Europe was 
not stagnant but hyperbolic and it was remarkably stable. Industrial Revolution, “the prime 
engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212), had no impact on changing the 
economic growth trajectory. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) is 
contradicted by data. 
 
 
 
Former USSR 
 
Figure 4. No takeoff from stagnation to growth. Economic growth in the former USSR was 
not stagnant but hyperbolic and it was remarkably stable. Industrial Revolution, “the prime 
engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212), had no impact on changing the 
economic growth trajectory. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) is 
contradicted by data.  
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Asia 
 
Figure 5. No takeoff from stagnation to growth. Economic growth in Asia (including 
Japan) was not stagnant but hyperbolic before the alleged takeoff and it was remarkably 
stable. The minor boosting after the alleged takeoff was not a transition from stagnation to 
growth but a transition from growth to growth. It was similar to the commonly-observed 
transitions to slower trajectories but in this case it was preceded by a minor and temporary 
boosting. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) is contradicted by 
data.  
 
Africa 
 
 
Figure 6. No takeoff from stagnation to growth. Economic growth in Africa was not 
stagnant but hyperbolic. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) is 
contradicted by data. Shortly after the alleged dramatic but non-existent escape from the 
postulated Malthusian trap, economic growth in Africa started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. 
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Latin America 
 
 
Figure 7. No takeoff from stagnation to growth. Economic growth in Latin America was 
not stagnant but hyperbolic. At the time of the alleged takeoff, economic growth in Latin 
America was already following a slower trajectory. The alleged takeoff is replaced by a 
slower growth. The “spectacular” or “stunning” escapes from Malthusian trap (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220) never happened because there was no stagnation and no trap.  Unified 
Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) is contradicted by data.  
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